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Abstract
This article emphasises the non-economic goals of economic
nationalism and in particular its often overlooked political
goals. Drawing parallels between economic nationalisms in
Central Europe and East Asia, it focuses on Poland and Hun-
gary and asks why did these countries turn to economic
nationalism. The article traces this turn to ideational founda-
tions developed by right-wing intellectuals over the last two
decades, arguing that right-wing intellectuals believed that
liberalism has failed what they conceived of its most impor-
tant (political) purpose, the need of a radical break with the
communist past. Based on a study of the writings and careers
of leading Polish and Hungarian right-wing intellectuals, the
article draws attention to the nature of the perceived threat
to the nation. It contributes to the sociology of nationalism
an analysis of how such a threat emerges and translates into
a guiding idea of illiberal economic policies.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The World Economic Crisis of 2007–2008 spurred an interest in “economic nationalism,” first as a potentially threat-
ening and “rising spectre” (Economist, 2009), then as a threat that failed to materialise and take the form of a
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withdrawal of national economies from world markets (Pryke, 2012). Various explanations for this failure were
proposed. They ranged from the rising complexity of world markets to the fact that economic nationalism itself is a
complex phenomenon defying attempts to define it in terms of specific policies, as argued extensively in the
literature (Helleiner, 2002; Pickel, 2003; Pryke, 2012; Shulman, 2000; Woll & Clift, 2013). No particular policy con-
tent defines economic nationalism as such, with the policy options it advocates going from protectionism to
economic liberalism and neoliberalism (Harmes, 2012; Kangas, 2013), depending on the context and the country's
level of engagement in international markets. Thus, at one end of the European continent, “economic nationalists”
can demand “British jobs for British workers” (Woll & Clift, 2013), while at the other end, the economic nationalism
of Ukraine or the Baltic states translates into unabashed support for European integration as the guarantee of
national survival par excellence vis-à-vis perceived Russian threats (Abdelal, 2001; Kuokštis, 2015). Studies of
economic nationalism seen in opposition to liberal market integration have been restricted to notions of “resource”
nationalism (Vivoda, 2009).
Throughout the 2010s, there was an increase in cases of “economic nationalism,” mostly identified as such
because its proponents invoked the defence of their nation against liberalism. Thus, while it is true that no country
responded to the World Economic Crisis of 2007–2008 by massively retreating from world markets, social scientists
have seen phenomena such as the Brexit campaign or Donald Trump's protectionist trade policy as signs of populism
or “ethno-national populism” (Berezin, 2019, Bonikowski, 2017, Gusterson, 2017), without, however, focusing much
on the claim that what these actors pretend to enact are instances of “economic nationalism.”
In the European Union, it is in particular the former best performers of European integration, Poland and
Hungary, that throughout the 2010s became some of the most vocal challengers of liberalism, both economic
and political. According to various analyses, these countries have enacted “banking” (Mér}o & Piroska, 2016),
“finance” (Johnson & Barnes, 2014), or “economic nationalism” (Bohle & Greskovits, 2018). Together with
Russia, they pursued a model of developmental statism explicitly invoking economic nationalism and openly
seeking to confront liberalism as the major threat to their countries (Appel & Orenstein, 2018; Bluhm &
Varga, 2020). It is, however, unclear why these countries would embrace economic nationalism. Several explana-
tions focus on discontent with the economic results of globalisation (Appel & Orenstein, 2018; Toplišek, 2020)
or the societal demand stemming from domestic business following the late 2000s crisis years (Naczyk, 2014;
Scheiring, 2019).
This article's contribution is a study of the development of economic nationalist ideas; it argues that impor-
tant parts of these countries' political and intellectual right-wing elites sought a break with liberalism already
around the turn of the century. It builds on the argument that while there is little that makes certain policies
particular to it, economic nationalism nevertheless originates in a specific perspective, an “organic” or “holistic”
depiction of economy and society (Nakano, 2007; Szlajfer, 2012). This perspective sees socio-economic mea-
sures as instrumental to ensuring goals of “national survival.” Here the notion of an “existential threat” to the
nation serves as an important element in approaching the resurgence of economic nationalism, as economic
nationalists frame the rationale for their policies as existential threats to the nation. Responding to such threats
requires safeguarding the nation-state against the opponents of economic nationalists, and this goal of
safeguarding the state essentially entails a political project that predates and prepares the ground for the
economic agenda.
The article explores these characteristics of economic nationalism in its theoretical part, contributing to a wider
literature concerned with how ideas helped in the development and diffusion of economic liberalism or neoliberalism
and now increasingly also of economic nationalism. Introducing a study of 16 leading right-wing intellectuals' writings
and careers in Poland and Hungary, it then moves to analysing in its empirical part why a perceived “existential
threat” to the nation emerged in Poland and Hungary and how it currently translates into policies of economic
nationalism. The article ends with a discussion of how the origins of economic nationalism are in these cases to be
found not in economic readings of national problems but in the pursuit of such political goals as “national unity,”
“sovereignty” and marginalisation of opponents considered illegitimate.
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2 | THE RESURGENCE OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN EAST CENTRAL
EUROPE
Pointing to the historical and geographical diversity of economic nationalisms, studies of economic nationalism have
generally warned against attempts to construct general theories of the phenomenon (Abdelal, 2001; Helleiner, 2002;
Pickel, 2003; Shulman, 2000; Woll & Clift, 2013). Most scholars agree that “economic nationalism is not so much
about the economy as it is about the nation” (Pickel, 2003), and the forms it takes differ depending on the concrete
situations in which nationalisms arise. Some have nevertheless argued in favour of more general theories. Their
starting point was the “holistic” (Szlajfer, 2012) or “organic” perspective of most economic nationalisms. Unlike (neo)
liberalism, the “organic” perspective does not understand the economy as an “aggregate of individual behaviours”
(Nakano, 2007) but as part and parcel of national “organisms.” Goals such as the “survival of the nation” require a re-
orientation of the relationship between economic and other policies. This means that economic policy will be judged
not just by reference to economic goals of individual wellbeing but primarily by reference to the goal of “national sur-
vival.” In particular, a rich literature on East Asian economic nationalism has shown how economic nationalism
emerges out of political concerns over saving the nation by containing the influence of communists or, to take the
case of Japan, ensuring “national power” on the international scene (Hall, 2004; Johnson, 1989; Leftwich, 1995;
Stubbs, 2009).
Similarly, Poland and Hungary's newly rediscovered enthusiasm for state interventionism addresses woes con-
cerning the “survival of the nation” and that involve politics, culture and demography. “National-conservatives,” as
present-day power-holders in Poland and Hungary refer to themselves, have proven to have developed such a holis-
tic perspective. They have changed to the “national interest” not just economic policy, but also social policy, constitu-
tional and media laws, the status of private universities and research institutes, or immigration and foreign policy
(Blokker, 2019; Krzyżanowski, 2018; Varga & Buzogány, 2020).
The insistence on “national survival” explains why economic nationalism, even in the forms that come closest to
neoliberalism and its insistence on welfare retrenchment, often promises at least to rescue a rudimentary sphere of
welfare for the members of the nation, as captured in the notion of “welfare chauvinism” in analyses of West
European nationalist parties (Faist, 1994). In analyses of East Asian economic nationalism, welfare or social spending
serves goals of making titular nations internationally more competitive by targeting expenditures at those groups
employed in export-oriented industries or other “productive” branches, but also in the state administration
(Kwon, 2005).
Similar “productivist” perspectives also drive social spending in Hungary, while Poland's economic nationalists
went beyond such approaches to introduce universalist welfare programs. Because of its “workfarist” approach,
the socio-economic agenda of Viktor Orbán's government initially appeared unabashedly “neoliberal,” continuing
or even deepening the trend of welfare retrenchment to have preceded it. It replaced modest but unconditional
welfare provision to the long-term unemployed with a model offering benefits only to those individuals
accepting underpaid community service work (Bohle & Greskovits, 2018; Scharle & Szikra, 2015; Szikra, 2014;
Vidra, 2018).
Yet the socio-economic agenda of the “national-conservative” PiS and Fidesz1 displays several elements that
part ways with the social retrenchment and insistence on the necessity to keep wages low for attracting foreign
investments, characterising the previous decades since the fall of communism. In Hungary, the government intro-
duced tax breaks for families with several children more recently, ranging from lifetime tax exemptions to paying for
cars and mortgages (Walker, 2019) and minimum wage increases, doubling in 2019 the 2010 figure (OECD, 2018;
Patricolo, 2019). The government achieved a 10% reduction in household energy bills (Byrne, 2015a) and success-
fully defended mortgage owners that had acquired Swiss francs-denominated loans from an increase in interest rates
(Byrne, 2015b). The leading economist of the government-close conservative think tank Századvég claimed that
since 2011 his government's “economic policy yearly channels 3% of GDP away from capital owners towards wage-
earners and families” (György, 2017).
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While it is important not to take such assessments as statements of facts, they are important for showing how
Fidesz-close analysts frame the wider goals of their policies: not as universal support, but as purposively tailored
schemes to support “productive” citizens, as in the case of the East-Asian developmental welfare state (Kwon, 2009).
Poland's national-conservative PiS went further than Fidesz and in 2015 introduced a universalist welfare pro-
gramme in the form of nationwide children allowances. It thus raised household incomes directly by introducing the
universalist 500+ children allowance programme (Goraus-Tanska, 2017), the largest addition to the country's social
safety net since 1989 (Orenstein, 2018). Additionally, and next to lowering the pension age, the government
increased the minimum wage to relative levels above those in any neighbouring country, including Germany and
Hungary (relative to national average wages, CEE Market Watch, 2018).
Equally rooted in the organic perspective inherent in economic nationalism, the nation-state is of special impor-
tance for “national survival” as its proponents claim that it gives coherence to the various “organs” of the nation. Eco-
nomic nationalism therefore demands control over and promises protection to the “nation-state”; nation-states
represent values in themselves, “higher” goods that deserve protection as the guarantee for turning the agendas of
economic nationalists into reality. In the words of Yoram Hazony, a proponent of “national-conservatism” in the
United States and Israel to visit Orbán in 2019 in Budapest, states are the “souls” of nations (Hazony, 2009). Nation-
alists tend to resist liberal policies as existential threats if they curtail “sovereignty” and the powers of the state in
areas perceived as vital for “national survival.” Here, too, there is an evident parallel to the literature on East-Asian
cases: economic nationalism in South Korea or Japan is indistinguishable from the notion of the developmental state
(Amsden, 1989; Hall, 2004; Johnson, 1989; Johnson, 1999), a state seen as the guarantee and also the main instru-
ment for securing national survival.
The re-emergence of economic nationalism, together with its fondness of the nation-state in Poland and Hun-
gary, is not a straightforward phenomenon. After all, both countries were among the best performers of market and
European integration reforms. Other countries seemed to be muddling through the transition spanning the years
between the fall of communism in 1989 and the EU's Eastern Enlargement; they experimented with a mix of liberal-
ism and social protection measures and earned criticism for their lack of resolution in pursuing “reforms.” In contrast,
Poland seemingly represented the success story of sustained growth thanks to liberalising and welfare retrenchment
measures. Its “successful” path continued unabated even by the crisis years of the late 2000s (Milanovic, 2015). Eco-
nomic and political liberalism seemed in both countries to be the dominant paradigm for policy, with right-wing alter-
natives hardly standing a chance to compete with it (Morlang, 2003; Tavits & Letki, 2009). How could then
economic nationalism replace liberalism precisely in the countries that seemed to have best internalised liberal
principles?
Economic nationalism in Poland and Hungary is usually explained in terms of these countries' disappointment
with liberalism following the financial crisis of 2007–2008 (Appel & Orenstein, 2018) or as a reaction to “neoliberal
globalisation” (for a review, seeToplišek, 2020). This article adds to these explanations an analysis of how “neoliberal
globalisation” came to be perceived as a threat in Poland and Hungary, two countries most closely associated with
its successful pursuit. In doing so, it builds on the wider literature on the importance of ideas for capturing
(Hall, 1993) and explaining institutional and policy change (Campbell & Pedersen, 2014; Blyth, 2002; for applications
to the emergence of neoliberalism in Eastern Europe, see Ban, 2016; Bockman & Eyal, 2002).
This article points to the strengthening of a right-wing milieu around the turn of the century, supported by intel-
lectuals engaged in “ideology production” (Bourdieu, 1979). This milieu was increasingly mobilising against the per-
ceived threat of continuous influence of former communists over politics and economy and against the former
communists' support for liberal economic reforms. I illustrate this argument by focusing on one particular element of
the right-wing: the intellectuals defending PiS and Fidesz in public, advising these parties or writing their position
papers and programmes. I argue that these intellectuals propagated the idea of an alleged alliance or continuity
between former communists and liberalism, helping cast these ideologies as similarly “dangerous” and “foreign.” This
alleged continuity between communism and liberalism became an “existential threat for the nation” for those seg-
ments of the right-wing that would take the power in the 2010s.
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The data for this article come from surveying a group of self-termed “right-wing” or “conservative” intellectuals
in terms of writings, publications, programmatic statements and publicly accessible interviews. A list of these intellec-
tuals is available in Appendix A; it consists of the intellectuals that have joined Fidesz and PiS and helped formulate
these parties' programmatic positions. They count as key intellectual figures or intellectual supporters of these
parties, and most have also been listed in other studies, most notably in the literature on intellectual histories of East
Central Europe (Mándi, 2015; Rae, 2008; Trencsényi, Kopeček, Gabrijelčič, Falina, & Baár, 2018). The data collection
also relies on volumes documenting debates between these intellectuals and usually liberal opponents
(Kosiewski, 2008; Smolar, 2006).
The analysis of conservative publications uses “adaptive coding” (Layder, 1998; Stevens, 2011); that is, it identi-
fied an initial set of codes from secondary literature. It then revised or expanded these codes while going through
the body publications in order to identify “key themes,” two of which structure the next section: the alleged continu-
ity between communists and liberals and the theme of nations requiring strong states to serve them.
While in both countries right-wing intellectuals of self-professed “conservative” convictions were vocal through-
out the 1990s, their statements and writings in both countries reach a far more radical critique of liberalism
throughout the 2000s. Former communists returned to power for the second time in the early 2000s, and soon
became embroiled in both countries in large political scandals, such as the Lew Rywin corruption scandal in Poland
(2002) or the leaked 2006 speech of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in Hungary, in which Gyurcsány admitted
lying “day and night” about the country's finances (Körösényi, Ondré, & Hajdú, 2017; Zarycki, 2009). Table 1 below
offers an overview of these key developments and associated dates.
Conservative intellectuals in both countries reacted to the return of former communists to power and political
scandals by publishing manifestos and joining or advising Fidesz and PiS. From the moment that these parties ret-
urned to power, conservative intellectuals received public offices in ministries and state institutions (see Appendix A
for an overview of these intellectuals' careers). It is to this conservative discourse of the 2000s and the “wider goals
behind policies” (Hall, 1993) that they heralded—structured around two key themes—that the article turns to in its
following section.





1989–1991: The Solidarity government of
T. Mazowiecki
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF),
1990–1994
First return to power
of former
communists
Democratic Left Alliance 1993–1997;
coalition with the Polish People's Party
Hungarian Socialist Party, 1994–1998;





Democratic Left Alliance 2001–2005,
coalition with the Polish People's Party
Hungarian Socialist Party, 2002–2010;
coalition with the liberal Alliance of Free
Democrats 2002–2008
First wave of the EU's Eastern Enlargement: May 2004
Major political scandals affecting former communists




Law and Justice, 2005–2007 coalition
government with two other parties; Lech
Kaczynski, President of Poland,
2005–2010; Law and Justice
governments 2015–present; Andrzej
Duda, President of Poland, 2015–
present
Fidesz, 1998–2002, coalition with two other
parties, including MDF Fidesz, 2010–
present (political alliance with the
Christian Democratic People's Party since
2006)
210 VARGA
3 | A CONSERVATIVE EMBRACE OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM
Initial anti-liberal criticisms in Poland and Hungary took shape in the early 1990s when former communists returned
to power (1993–1994). The criticism concerned the “nomenklatura's return,” claiming that the electoral success of
former communists proves the communist elite's continuous—and illegitimate—influence across society
(Podgórecki, 1995) and that it proves the existence of a “nomenklatura bourgeoisie,” allied with international financial
investors (Tellér, 1999). This narrative specifically blamed the liberals for tolerating this development, without yet
claiming that there is a fundamental affinity between liberalism and communism. In Hungary, a group of more explic-
itly right-wing intellectuals joined Fidesz in the 1990s, including such central figures as Gyula Tellér (longest serving
advisor of Viktor Orbán) and György Matolcsy, an economist with numerous ministerial appointments and head of
Hungary's Central Bank since 2013. Although the criticism of liberalism expressed by Tellér (2009) would later on
culminate with an article reducing liberals to an allegedly “Jewish” lineage of anti-Hungarian politicians, the writings
of this group lack the substantial anti-liberal content of the 2000s. In contrast, Polish conservatives made greater
efforts to combine academic activities with political initiatives, launching already throughout the 1990s numerous
political parties. Some of their first representatives—such as Aleksander Hall—clashed with liberals as early as the
1980s, for instance, by protecting the image of Roman Dmowski's National Democracy (the 1886–1947 Endecja
party) from liberal criticism of Endecja's anti-semitism (Matyja, 2015).
3.1 | Continuity and affinity between former communists and liberals in constituting a
threat to the nation
The 2000s brought an intensifying critique of liberalism. Conservatives increasingly went beyond only arguing that
liberals have an agenda that disrupts political institutions by weakening the state. In addition, they started accusing
liberals of resembling the communists, as liberals also deepen societal divisions by questioning traditional forms of
authority (Fodor, 2009; Legutko, 2006; Molnár, 2010), praising entrepreneurship while “devaluating work” and by
insisting—in an economistic vein—on “contractual relationships” that strike at such natural bonds as the [traditional]
family (Krasnodębski, 2012; Legutko, 2005). In the words of Dariusz Gawin and Dariusz Karłowicz, liberalism stands
accused of “economism,” a narrow and disruptive societal vision that needs to be opposed (Karłowicz, 2005).
As in the case of “populist conservatives” in the United States and their discourse about the liberals' “treason” of
their country's interests (Lowi, 1995), in Poland and Hungary, too, the alleged alliance or ideological affinity between
the left and the liberals became a dominant conservative narrative. To the extent that both left and liberals promoted
the accession to the EU in 2004 and shaped the negotiations preparing their countries for joining the EU, this led
conservatives to a heightened perception of their political environment as threatening and populated by “globalist”
“enemies” of the nation.2 The “nation” and, by extension, the “nation-state” become expressions of freedom, leading
to the radical conception that any ideology claiming to transcend nationalism is inimical to freedom and, therefore,
totalitarian (Legutko, 2016). In the words of András Lánczi, author of a “Conservative Manifesto” (2002) and long-
standing key intellectual figure associated with Fidesz:
The nation is not a political concept in Eastern Europe as it is, say, in the United States. [In Eastern
Europe] [t]he nation is the highest expression of the sense of belonging, a sense of freedom,
defending the roots of a culture […]. (Lánczi, 2007)
Conservatives increasingly operated with a double extension of what the existential threat to the nation is
about: from communism to liberalism and from liberalism to the project of European (market) integration. Post-
communist parties in Poland and Hungary were most closely associated with the liberal reforms required by
transition, European integration and Euro-area conditionality, leading these countries during the final stage of EU
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accession. Accordingly, national-conservatives increasingly perceived as suspect not only the postcommunist
political formations but also the reforms enacted in the name of liberalism. These include market liberalisation,
“Europeanisation” and the “high social costs” incurred by the “victims” of transition, such as “permanent fear
from losing their jobs, being paid meagre salaries, [and] suffering from both material and moral needs.”
(Lánczi, 2007). Conservative intellectuals hailed the electoral victories of the parties they supported as victories
of the transition's “victims” (Krasnodębski, 2005; Tellér, 2014). It is to these “victims” that policies of national-
conservatives need to do justice.
This wording contrasts strongly with the label of “transition losers,” widely applied across postcommunist
countries to describe the social strata harmed by the transition away from communism (Brainerd, 1998; Tucker,
Pacek, & Berinsky, 2002). However, there is a difference between the two countries in how to define the
transition “victims.” Hungarian intellectuals called for justice to the “middle class,” even though understood so
broadly as to encompass two thirds of the population (Molnár, 2010; Tellér, 2009, 2014). In contrast, major
conservative Polish intellectuals understood the lowest social strata as the “true victims” of liberal reforms
(Gawin, 2006; Krasnodębski, 2006) and claimed to follow in this understanding the Polish tradition of interwar
“solidarism.”3
3.2 | Strong states pursuing social policies that serve “the nation”
The identification of liberalism as communism's successor and as the main threat to their countries' “sovereignty”
made conservatives increasingly reluctant vis-à-vis key liberal concepts such as rule-of-law, competition, self-inter-
est, or markets. First, “corrupt” states cannot realise principled actions, with “corrupt” meaning a state still “infil-
trated” by communist legacies, for instance, Hungary's communist-era Constitution, replaced by Fidesz with a new
Constitution in 2012 (Fodor & Stumpf, 2007). Second, as outgrowths of self-interest, markets are intrinsically
suspect (Gawin, 2006; Molnár, 2010), and policies require an “active” and “strong” state. In the words of Gábor
G. Fodor, a leader of Szazádvég, Fidesz' political foundation:
Today it is clear that both the diagnosis of market logic and the therapy it offered have failed. They
have failed on the level of principles, because if market logic is made absolute, it is not capable of pro-
viding the conditions of welfare, solidarity, fairness and cooperation for everyone. And they have
failed on the level of practice, because the global economic crisis has shown the flaws of neo-liberal
principles on the basis of facts. […] there is a need for an active, intelligent and strong state that […]
adjust[s] the market's mechanisms […] But instead of an active, strong and intelligent state we are wit-
nessing an impotent, over-stretched and corrupt state that makes its citizens distrustful.
(Fodor, 2009)
This critique of liberalism varies in virulence: some simply accused liberalism of ignoring the importance of the state
(Skiba, 2010; Stumpf, 2009), while others invoked criticisms of liberalism based on the writings of conservative “rev-
olutionary” Carl Schmitt or German-American post-war conservatives Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin. This latter
group of intellectuals (Cichocki, 1999; Fodor, 2004; Lánczi, 2002; Legutko, 1994, 2006) expanded the initial criticism
of liberalism by claiming that rule-of-law, checks and balances and individualism all undermine state sovereignty and
restrict the state's capacity to define and pursue state interests (for a more comprehensive discussion of these posi-
tions, see Balázs, 2014; Rae, 2008; Trencsényi et al., 2018). They also sensed and equivocally thematised the West's
“marginalisation” of East Central Europe, reminding them of the centre–periphery relations that paved the way to
Russia's (and later to the Soviet Union's) domination of Europe's Eastern half (for reviews of these arguments, see
Gagyi, 2016; Zarycki, 2014).4
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3.3 | From key themes to policies
The two key themes discussed above have given PiS and Fidesz an imprint of economic nationalism that has perme-
ated their discourse and policies. By the second half of the 2000s, most of the intellectuals mentioned above held
important advisory or leading positions in public institutions or think tanks and participated in drafting the political
programmes of PiS and Fidesz. In Poland, important venues bringing these intellectuals together were the Cracow-
based think tank Centre for Political Thought (Osrodek Mysli Politycznej—OMP) and the presidential chancellery of
the late Lech Kaczynski. Marek Cichocki and Dariusz Gawin served as advisors of the late president and Zdzisław
Krasnodębski as a member of the Honorary Committee supporting Kaczynski's presidential candidature. Another
venue was the first PiS-dominated government of 2005–2007, in which Ryszard Legutko became the minister for
education.
In Hungary, it was the prime ministerial office during 1998–2002 and the Fidesz-close Századvég think tank that
advanced the careers of intellectuals outside of academia, including István Stumpf, András Lánczi, Gábor G. Fodor
and László György; after Fidesz' victory in the 2010 elections, Századvég became the main recipient of government
policy consultancy contracts (Erdélyi, 2016).
These career advancements were also reflected in the programmatic documents issued by the two parties. In
Hungary, the 2010 “National cooperation program,” the founding document of the new regime, repeatedly stresses
its “revolutionary” mission of redressing the “bad government” of its predecessors (a key concept for conservative
criticisms of liberals, see Fodor, 2009) and the deepening social divisions caused by “the pursuit of narrow interests”
during the “left-liberals’” time in power. Similarly, the PiS 2014 political programme (drafted with the assistance of
some of the intellectuals surveyed in this study) quotes from Popes John Paul II and Francis and calls to “stigmatise
the existence of economic mechanisms [that …] strengthen the wealth of one and poverty of the other […] The same
way as the commandment ‘Do not kill’ sets clear limits for safeguarding the value of human life, today we must say
‘no’ to the economy of exclusion and social inequality. This economy kills.”5
Restoring state functions for promoting socio-economic development is an issue that has long left the academic
publications of conservative intellectuals to become commonplace statements of Polish prime minister Mateusz
Morawiecki or of Hungary's Head of the Central Bank and former Economy Minister Matolcsy. Matolcsy insisted on
turning the Central Bank into an arm of the government while presenting his approach as part and parcel of a “con-
servative revolution” (Matolcsy, 2010). Morawiecki, a banker with international experience, underlined the impor-
tance of a state-controlled banking sector, triggering accusations in the Financial Times of wanting to return his
country to socialism (Miszerak & Rohac, 2017).
While considerable international attention goes to party leaders Kaczynski and Orbán, it has been policy experts
like Morawiecki and Matolcsy that have designed the budgets for realising the wider nationalist agenda. Both justify
socio-economic measures not in terms of increasing their countries' attractiveness vis-à-vis foreign investors but as
serving wider goals of national survival. Despite the analyses depicting the national-conservatives' socio-economic
model as “neoliberal,” what these politicians introduce is hardly a neoliberal “Schumpeterian workfare state”
(Jessop, 1999). That is, it is not anymore what Bob Jessop called a “post-national” “competition state” looking to
attract foreign direct investment through tax breaks and lean social policies, and that, throughout much of transition
from communism, best described the approach followed by the countries of the Visegrád group (Drahokoupil, 2008).
Instead, Matolcsy underlines that the key “mistake” of liberals was allowing foreigners to “take control” over his
country in the 1990s. Consequently, economic policies should follow political goals to reduce or eliminate this con-
trol (Matolcsy, 2019). Abandoning the “competition-state” approach and the social retrenchment it entails, Hungary
combines punitive measures against the unemployed with numerous measures to assist those that the government
qualifies as needy. These include “families” and “wage-earners,” to use the wording of László György, the former
leading economist of Századvég and currently state secretary for economic strategy. “Wage-earners” is an important
notion in this context since it implies that policies assist citizens not universally but in their “productive” capacity.
Similarly, the socio-economic agenda of the PiS government is said to serve goals of “national survival” and
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development; to take the official justification for Poland's most generous reform, the 500+ child allowance pro-
gramme, the goal of family policy is “avoiding civilizational collapse through the de-population of our country”
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc , 2014).
4 | DISCUSSION: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM
IN POLAND AND HUNGARY
A socio-economic model combining workfare elements with support schemes targeted at wage-earners and families
resembles the developmental welfare state and its explicit focus on national survival (Johnson, 1999;
Kwon, 2005, 2009), a model that policy makers such as Morawiecki and Matolcsy are well aware of.6 This latter type
of state subordinates social policies to national development, spending or intervening as to help “wage-earners” meet
consumption needs, but otherwise subordinating them to their employers and limiting or ignoring their collective
organisation (see the Hungarian government's recent [2018] “slave law,” allowing employers to ask staff to work up
to 400 hours per year of overtime; Bohle, 2019). Yet a similar model or intellectual current failed to gain elsewhere
the influence and power that national-conservatives hold in Poland and Hungary (Korkut, 2012; Trencsényi, 2014):
instead of a fully-fledged “illiberal turn” as in the case of Poland and Hungary's “national-conservatives,” the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and the Baltic states feature less severe “illiberal swerve[s]” (Buštíková &
Guasti, 2019; Havlík, 2019; Kim, 2020; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2018).
The approach followed in this article suggests that what facilitated this difference was the right-wing's varying
capacity to draw parallels between liberals and former communists and portray these two together as a threat to the
nation. Wanting to downplay their association with the communist regime, the Polish and Hungarian postcommunist
left embraced more fiscal reforms while in power, and more market liberalisation and welfare cuts than right-wing
parties (Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Tavits & Letki, 2009). Strongly anti-communist, important segments of the right-
wing—including those to form PiS and Fidesz—regarded the left as illegitimate in its embrace of liberalising market
reforms, even though at that time PiS and Fidesz still supported the market reforms they would later on attack as
economic nationalists. Equally important, Polish and Hungarian liberals accepted early on the postcommunist left-
wing as a legitimate presence, as captured in Tadeusz Mazowiecki's “policy of the thick line” to be drawn “between
[communist] past and present” (Michnik & Havel, 1993). However, this acceptance made important segments of the
right-wing grow increasingly suspicious both of the “thick line” and of the liberals.
To take a contrasting case, Czechia differs strongly from Poland and Hungary on this account. Czech social dem-
ocrats led the country in the run-up to EU accession and implemented a restrictive fiscal reform in preparation for
adopting the Euro (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012; Císař, 2017; Drahokoupil, 2008), even though they were arguably less
supportive of welfare retrenchment than similar formations in Poland and Hungary (Orenstein, 2001; Potucek, 2004;
Sil, 2017). However, they were a new creation with a precommunist tradition, not a communist successor party.
Coupled with Czechia's early and resolute lustration law, this fact suggests why right-wing allegations over continu-
ing communist influences under a liberal guise hardly had the base they did in Poland and Hungary and why allega-
tions about an “existential threat” to the nation that would call for economic nationalism hardly materialised.7
Similar to the emergence of free-market liberalism in Eastern Europe, right-wing intellectuals and their broader
milieus hardly turned to economic nationalism out of economic considerations. Back in the 1980s, liberalism was
winning the support of intellectuals in the region not because of its economic agenda but because it promised intel-
lectuals a rationale for resisting intrusive state bureaucracies in universities (Bockman & Eyal, 2002). The key source
of dissatisfaction of right-wing political and intellectual milieus with economic liberalism was that its economic poli-
cies of liberalisation and privatisation missed their political goals of limiting the influence of former communists in
politics and economy and were dismissive of the role of the nation-state in “preserving the nation.” Former commu-
nists even took control over liberal and EU integration reforms and won parliamentary elections just as the two
countries were preparing to join the EU.
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This helps explain the particular virulence of nationalism characterising the Hungarian and Polish right-wing.
While in most other countries anti-communist elites held to the belief that liberalism is the best way to curtail the
influence of former communists, in Poland and Hungary, parts of the political and economic elite came to believe
that it is precisely liberalism that helps secure that influence and therefore translates into a major existential threat
to national survival.
5 | CONCLUSIONS
Drawing parallels between the ways that economic nationalisms in Central Europe and East Asia are articulated
around political goals, this article has focused on Poland and Hungary to explain the emergence of economic nation-
alism. It traced the turn to economic nationalism in these two countries to ideational foundations developed by
right-wing intellectuals over the last two decades. These right-wing intellectuals believed that liberalism has failed
what they conceived of its most important (political) purpose, the need of a radical break with the communist past.
The article draws attention to the nature of the perceived “existential threat” to the nation and contributes to studies
of nationalism an analysis of how such a threat perception emerges and translates into a guiding idea of illiberal eco-
nomic policies.
Perceptions of such “existential threats” are important in explaining how political and other actors might
embrace economic nationalism, and this article linked economic nationalism to the development of such perceived
threats. It also linked economic nationalism to ideational foundations that help understand economic nationalism as
a broad conception subordinating economic to political goals of national survival. This invites broader research about
the constitution of such perceived threats or more broadly about what other studies have called the “supply-side” of
nationalism. While an increasing number of studies has focused on political parties as the main shapers of such sup-
ply (for reviews, see Rydgren, 2007, Bonikowski, 2017), we need to know more about how political parties them-
selves might build on or even appropriate ideational foundations developed in wider movements, in which
intellectual “ideology producers” play an important part.8
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1 The abbreviations stand for the parties Law and Justice (PiS—Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc) and Alliance of Young Democrats
(Fidesz—Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége), ruling since 2015 in Poland and 2010 in Hungary, respectively.
2 The choice of words is grounded in an illiberal conservatism of European (German) extraction: see the wide-reaching
appeal in both countries of Carl Schmitt's distinction between “friends” and “enemies” as the fundamental notion
for approaching and understanding politics (Balázs, 2014; Bunikowski, 2018). In both Poland and Hungary, major con-
servative publications dedicate special issues to Carl Schmitt or pose their entire programmes under headings
of Schmittian inspiration (such as Századvég's flagship publication National Interests being dedicated to the
pursuit of “sovereignty” or the Polish conservative Teologia Polityczna even named after Carl Schmitt's famous Political
Theology).
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3 Representative in this respect is the Polish intellectuals' ideological defence of solidarity against liberalism in the 2000s;
see such essays by Ryszard Legutko, influential conservative thinker and philosophy professor, former PiS Minister of Edu-
cation (2005), former State Secretary in the Presidential Chancellery under Lech Kaczynski and vice-president as PiS MEP
of the European Parliament until July 2019, as “Why I do not like liberalism” and “The Open Society and the idea of soli-
darity” (in his 2005 volume “Paradise restored”) and of the other PiS MEP of academic extraction, Zdzisław Krasnodębski,
“One of the most Polish words [Solidarity]” (2012).
4 Important to note, the lineage that these intellectuals attempt to construct is one that differs from the right-wing
illiberal political currents of the prewar and interwar periods, such as Poland‘s Endecja or Hungary's népi “national-
populists.” This does not mean that PiS and Fidesz do not take interest in that lineage, and it also does not mean
that conservative intellectuals repudiate it; see the Polish conservatives’ defence of Endecja against liberal critiques
mentioned above (Matyja, 2015; Palonen, 2009). Yet despite exceptions such as Tellér's outspoken national-populist
position or the Polish intellectuals' interest in interwar “solidarism,” the present-day generation of conservative
intellectuals in Poland and Hungary is quite strongly influenced by Western US or German conservatives, such as
Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss, Russell Kirk, Thomas Molnar and Carl Schmitt (Buzogány & Varga, 2019;
Dąbrowska, 2019).
5 Hungary's “National cooperation program,” a document passed by Parliament on May 22, 2010, is online at http://www.
parlament.hu/irom39/00047/00047.pdf (accessed 19/03/2019); the PiS political program of 2014 is available at http://
pis.org.pl/dokumenty (accessed 19/03/2019).
6 Morawiecki often refers to the writings of such heterodox or neo-structuralist economists as Justin Yifu Lin and Maria
Mazzucato (Jasiecki, 2019). Matolcsy has long been a self-termed “heterodox” economist opposed to Western liberal pre-
cepts (Dąbrowska, Buzogány, & Varga, 2018; Seb}ok, 2018).
7 Even though Vaclav Klaus defended ideas favouring a “national” form of capitalism, Czechia became the regional leader in
attracting FDI (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). Slovenia actually is a case in which former communists entered political alli-
ances with liberals but, in contrast to the Visegrád countries, failed to shape such crucial areas as privatisation laws or wel-
fare reforms. In fact, the noncommunist centre-left alliance in power throughout much of transition has largely refrained
from liberalising the country's welfare state. Furthermore, Slovenia's version of communism can hardly be portrayed as
“alien” to the country (Crowley & Stanojevic, 2011; Feldmann, 2014), a key trope in the discourse of Polish and Hungarian
“national-conservatives.”
8 For such broader analyses, focusing not on intellectuals, but on civil society and popular culture, see for instance
Berezin (2017) or Molnár (2016).
REFERENCES
Abdelal, R. (2001). National purpose in the world economy: Post-Soviet states in comparative perspective. Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press.
Amsden, A. (1989). Asia's next giant. South Korea and late industrialization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Appel, H., & Orenstein, M. A. (2018). From triumph to crisis: Neoliberal economic reform in postcommunist countries. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Balázs, Z. (2014). Political theory in Hungary after the regime change. International Political Anthropology, 7, 1–22.
Ban, C. (2016). Ruling ideas: How global neoliberalism goes local. Oxford University Press.
Berezin, M. (2017). On the construction sites of history: Where did Donald Trump come from? American Journal of Cultural
Sociology, 5, 322–337.
Berezin, M. (2019). Fascism and populism: Are they useful categories for comparative sociological analysis? Annual Review of
Sociology, 45, 345–361.
Blokker, P. (2019). Populist counter-constitutionalism, conservatism, and legal fundamentalism. European Constitutional Law
Review, 15(3), 519–543.
Bluhm, K., & Varga, M. (2020). Conservative developmental statism in East Central Europe and Russia. New Political Econ-
omy, 25, 642–659.
Blyth, M. (2002). Great transformations: Economic ideas and institutional change in the twentieth century. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Bockman, J., & Eyal, G. (2002). Eastern Europe as a laboratory for economic knowledge: The transnational roots of neoliber-
alism. American Journal of Sociology, 108, 310–352.
Bohle, D. (2019). Ungarns Winter des Unmuts. In Z. Berlin (Ed.), ZOiS Spotlight 4/2019. Berlin: ZOiS.
Bohle, D., & Greskovits, B. (2012). Capitalist diversity on Europe's periphery. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Bohle, D., & Greskovits, B. (2018). Politicising embedded neoliberalism: continuity and change in Hungary's development
model. West European Politics, 42(5), 1069–1093.
216 VARGA
Bonikowski, B. (2017). Ethno-nationalist populism and the mobilization of collective resentment. The British Journal of Sociol-
ogy, 68, S181–S213.
Bourdieu, P. (1979). Symbolic power. Critique of Anthropology, 4, 77–85.
Brainerd, E. (1998). Winners and losers in Russia's economic transition. American Economic Review, 1094–1116.
Bunikowski, D. (2018). The constitutional crisis in Poland, Schmittian questions and Kaczynski's political and legal
philosophy. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 26, 285–307.
Buštíková L., Guasti P. (2019). The State as a Firm: Understanding the Autocratic Roots of Technocratic Populism. East
European Politics and Societies: and Cultures, 33(2), 302–330. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325418791723
Buzogány, A., & Varga, M. (2019). Against “post-communism”. The conservative dawn in Hungary. In K. Bluhm & M. Varga
(Eds.), New conservatives in Russia and East Central Europe (pp. 70–91). London and New York: Routledge.
Byrne, A. (2015a). Orbanomics wins praise for protecting mortgage owners. Financial Times, 16.01.2015.
Byrne, A. (2015b). ‘Orbanomics’ confounds critics as Hungary's economy recovers. Financial Times, 9.06.2015.
Campbell, J. L., & Pedersen, O. K. (2014). The national origins of policy ideas: Knowledge regimes in the United States, France,
Germany, and Denmark. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cee Market Watch. (2018). Poland's govt to propose hiking minimum wage by 5.7% to PLN 2,220. Central European
Financial Observer. 14.06.2018
Cichocki, M. (1999). Ciągłosc i zmiana: czy konserwatyzm może nie byc rewolucyjny?. Warsaw: Bibl. Więzi.
Císař, O. (2017). Czech Republic: From post-communist idealism to economic populism. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Prague.
Crowley, S., & Stanojevic, M. , (2011). Varieties of Capitalism, Power Resources, and Historical Legacies: Explaining the
Slovenian Exception. Politics & Society, 39(2), 268–295. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329211405440.
Dąbrowska, E. (2019). New conservatism in Poland: the discourse coalition around “Law and Justice”. In K. Bluhm &
M. Varga (Eds.), New conservatives in Russia and East Central Europe, (92–112). London and New York: Routledge.
Dąbrowska, E., Buzogány, A., & Varga, M. (2018). The “Budapest–Warsaw Express”: Conservatism and the diffusion of economic
policies in Poland and Hungary. New Conservatives in Russia and East Central Europe, (178–197). Routledge.
Drahokoupil, J. (2008). Globalization and the state in Central and Eastern Europe: The politics of foreign direct investment.
London and New York: Routledge.
Economist, T. (2009). The return of economic nationalism. The Economist.
Erdélyi, K. (2016). Üstökösszerű karriert futott be a közbeszerzési piacon 2010 óta a Századvég-csoport. Atlatszo. https://
atlatszo.hu/2016/06/08/ustokosszeru-karriert-futott-be-a-kozbeszerzesi-piacon-2010-ota-a-szazadveg-csoport/.
Faist, T. (1994). How to define a foreigner? The symbolic politics of immigration in German partisan discourse, 1978–1992.
West European Politics, 17, 50–71.
Feldmann, M. (2014). Coalitions and corporatism: The Slovenian political economy and the crisis. Government and Opposi-
tion, 49, 70–91.
Fodor, G. (2004). Pengeváltás—filozófia és politikai konzervativizmus. In Konzervativizmus régen és ma. Budapest: XXI. Század
Intézet.
Fodor, G. G. (2009). The ‘Strong State’ paradigm: Good government and the state in Central and Eastern Europe—Why do
we need a stronger state? In C. Arvanitopoulos (Ed.), Reforming Europe. Berlin: Springer.
Fodor, G. G., & Stumpf, I. (2007). A ‘jó kormányzás’ két értelme. Avagy a demokratikus kormányzás programja és feltételei.
Nemzeti Érdek, 3, 76–95.
Gagyi, A. (2016). “Coloniality of power” in East Central Europe: External penetration as internal force in post-socialist Hun-
garian politics. Journal of World-Systems Research, 22, 349–372.
Gawin, D. (2006). Obecny rząd i spór o model polskiej modernizacji. In A. Smolar (Ed.), Jaka Polska? Czyja Polska?. Warsaw:
Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego.
Goraus-Tanska, K. (2017). The Family 500+: Battling Child Poverty in Poland. Eurasian Perspectives (World Bank) [Online].
Available from: http://blogs.worldbank.org/europeandcentralasia/family-500-battling-child-poverty-poland.
Grzymala-Busse, A. M. (2002). Redeeming the communist past: The regeneration of communist parties in East Central Europe.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gusterson, H. (2017). From Brexit to Trump: Anthropology and the rise of nationalist populism. American Ethnologist, 44,
209–214.
György, L. (2017). Egyensúlyteremtés—A gazdaságpolitika missziója. Budapest: Századvég.
Hall, D. (2004). Japanese spirit, western economics: The continuing salience of economic nationalism in Japan. New Political
Economy, 9, 79–99.
Hall, P. A. (1993). Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: The case of economic policymaking in Britain. Comparative
Politics, 25, 275–296.
Harmes, A. (2012). The rise of neoliberal nationalism. Review of International Political Economy, 19, 59–86.
Havlík, V. (2019). Technocratic populism and political illiberalism in Central Europe. Problems of Post-Communism, 1–16.
Hazony, Y. (2009). The Jewish state: The struggle for Israel's soul. New York: Basic Books.
VARGA 217
Helleiner, E. (2002). Economic nationalism as a challenge to economic liberalism? Lessons from the 19th century.
International Studies Quarterly, 46, 307–329.
Jasiecki, K. (2019). “Conservative modernization” and the rise of law and justice in Poland. In K. Bluhm & M. Varga (Eds.),
New conservatives in Russia and East Central Europe. New York and London: Routledge.
Jessop, B. (1999). The changing governance of welfare: recent trends in its primary functions, scale, and modes of coordina-
tion. Social Policy & Administration, 33, 348–359.
Johnson, C. (1989). South Korean democratization: the role of economic development. The Pacific Review, 2, 1–10.
Johnson, C. (1999). The developmental state: Odyssey of a concept. In M. Woo-Cumings (Ed.), The developmental state. Cor-
nell, CA: Cornell University Press.
Johnson, J., & Barnes, A. (2014). Financial nationalism and its international enablers: The Hungarian experience. Review of
International Political Economy, 22, 535–569.
Kangas, A. (2013). Market civilisation meets economic nationalism: The discourse of nation in R ussia's modernisation.
Nations and Nationalism, 19, 572–591.
Karłowicz, D. (2005). Sukces jako Imię Boże [Online]. Osrodek Mysli Politycznej. Available: http://www.omp.org.pl/
stareomp/index8082.html?module=subjects&func=printpage&pageid=448&scope=all [Accessed].
Kim, S. (2020). Between illiberalism and hyper-neoliberalism: Competing populist discourses in the Czech Republic.
European Politics and Society, 1–16.
Korkut, U. (2012). Liberalization challenges in Hungary: Elitism, progressivism, and populism. Palgrave Macmillan.
Körösényi, A., Ondré, P., & Hajdú, A. (2017). A “meteoric” career in Hungarian politics. In M. Bennister, B. Worthy, & P. 'T
Hart (Eds.), The leadership capital index: A new perspective on political leadership. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kosiewski, P. (Ed.) (2008). Pamięc jako przedmiot władzy. Warsaw: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego.
Krasnodębski, Z. (2005). Pożegnanie z III Rzeczpospolitą. Rzeczpospolita.
Krasnodębski, Z. (2006). Modernizacja po polsku. In J. Kloczkowski & M. Szułdrzynski (Eds.), Drogi do nowoczesnosci. Idea
modernizacji w polskiej mysli politycznej. Osrodek Mysli Politycznej: Kraków.
Krasnodębski, Z. (2012). Jedno z najbardziej polskich słów. In T. C.-P. Forum (Ed.), Wartosci w polityce i społeczenstwie.
Podstawowe pojęcia polityki w polskiej i czeskiej perspektywie. Brno.
Krzyżanowski, M. (2018). Discursive shifts in ethno-nationalist politics: On politicization and mediatization of the “refugee
crisis” in Poland. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 16, 76–96.
Kuokštis, V. (2015). Baltic states in world markets: Does Katzenstein's framework still hold? Journal of Baltic studies, 46,
109–126.
Kwon, H.-J. (2009). Policy learning and transfer: The experience of the developmental state in East Asia. Policy & Politics, 37,
409–421.
Kwon, H. J. (2005). Transforming the developmental welfare state in East Asia. Development and Change, 36, 477–497.
Lánczi, A. (2002). Konzervatív Kiáltvány. Budapest: Attraktor.
Lánczi, A. (2007). What is post-communism? Society and Economy, 29, 65–85.
Layder, D. (1998). Sociological practice: Linking theory and social research. London: Sage.
Leftwich, A. (1995). Bringing politics back in: Towards a model of the developmental state. The journal of development stud-
ies, 31, 400–427.
Legutko, R. (1994). Etyka absolutna i społeczenstwo otwarte. Arcana: Cracow.
Legutko, R. (2005). Raj przywrócony. Osrodek Mysli Politycznej: Cracow.
Legutko, R. (2006). Podzwonne dla błazna. Osrodek Mysli Politycznej: Cracow.
Legutko, R. (2016). The demon in democracy: Totalitarian temptations in free societies. New York.Encounter Books.
Lowi, T. J. (1995). The end of the republican era. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Mándi, T. (2015). Politikai gondolkodás. In A. Körösényi (Ed.), A magyar politikai rendszer. Budapest: Osiris.
Matolcsy, G. (2010). Konzervatív polgári forradalom indult! Világgazdaság, 22.06.2010.




Matyja, R. (2015). Songs of innocence and songs of experience. Polish Conservatism 1979–2011. In M. Kopeček &
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APPENDIX A: OVERVIEW OF SURVEYED CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUALS AND THEIR MAIN POLITICAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION IN POLAND AND HUNGARY 2002/2003–2018
TABLE A1 List of surveyed intellectuals
Profession Positions and affiliations
POLAND
Cichocki, Marek A. (b. 1966) Philosopher, political scientist Lecturer at Warsaw U.; Social Affairs
advisor to President L. Kaczynski; EU
Affairs advisor to President A. Duda;
Founder of Teologia Polityczna, head of
the Natolin think tank
Gawin, Dariusz (b. 1964) Historian Lecturer at Warsaw U.; Director of the
Warsaw Uprising Museum (appointed by
L. Kaczynski); Member of President Duda's





Professor at Łódz U.; Analyst for the
Natolin think tank (2006–2012);
coordinator of the Security section of the
President Duda's National Development
Council; advisor to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs (2015–2017)
Krasnodębski, Zdzisław (b. 1953) Sociologist Lecturer/professor at Warsaw U, Bremen U,
Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski U.; PiS MEP
since 2014; member of the Honorary
Committee supporting Lech Kaczynski
in the presidential elections in Poland;
2007–2009 member of the Public Service
220 VARGA
TABLE A1 (Continued)
Profession Positions and affiliations
Council to the Prime Minister; member of
the Program Board of PiS (2014)
Legutko, Ryszard (b. 1949) Philosopher Professor at Cracow U.; President of the
“Osrodek Mysli Politycznej” think tank
(1992–2005); PiS vice-president of the
Senate (2005–2007); PiS Minister of
Education (2007); State secretary in the
Presidential Chancellery (2007–2009);
MEP since 2009 and Vice-president of the
European Parliament until July 2019
Skiba, Leszek (b. 1978) Economist 2009 member and from 2013 Board member
of the Sobieski Institute; several
appointments to the National Bank
(expert) and Ministry of Finance (since
2015: under-secretary and from 2017
chief ombudsman for public finance
discipline)
Szałamacha, Paweł (b. 1969) Jurist, economist 2003–2011: member and chair of the
Sobieski Institute's Board; 2011–2015
PiS MP; numerous appointments,
including as State Secretary in the
Ministry of StateTreasury (2006–2007),
Minister of Finance (2015–2016),
member of the National Bank's Board
(2016–present)
Szczerski, Krzysztof (b. 1973) Political scientist Professor at Cracow U.; Foreign Affairs
vice-minister (2007); advisor and head of
President Duda's Chancellery since 2015
HUNGARY
G. Fodor, Gábor (b. 1975) Political scientist Research director and then Strategy-director
of the Fidesz-close Századvég foundation
(mid-2000s until present)
György, László (b. 1980) Economist State secretary for economic strategy
(2018–present)
Lead economist of Századvég (2015–2018)
Lecturer in economics, ELTE University
(2017–present)
Lánczi, András (b. 1956) Philosopher and political
theorist
Professor at Corvinus U.; Founder
(with R. Legutko) in 2008 of the
Center for European Renewal, an
international conservative organisation;
co-director of Századvég since 2010;
Rector of Corvinus University in
Budapest since 2016
Matolcsy, György (b. 1955) Economist Financial Research Institute Budapest and
EBRD (early 1990s); state secretary for
privatisation in the József Antall-government
(1990); authored the Fidesz economic
programme in the late 1990s and late 2000s;
Fidesz Minister of National Economy in
2000–2002; 2010–2013; Governor of the




Profession Positions and affiliations
Molnár, Attila Károly (b. 1961) Sociologist and historian of
ideas
Lecturer at Pázmány Péter Catholic University;
director of the “Thomas Molnar Institute” at
the “National Public Service University”
established by Fidesz in 2012
Schmidt, Mária (b. 1953) Historian Professor at Pázmány Péter Catholic
University; advisor to V. Orbán in
1998–2002; from 2004 until present—Head
of theTerror House Museum in Budapest
Stumpf, István (b. 1957) Jurist Head of the Fidesz-close Századvég political
foundation (2002–2010); Orbán's professor
at the Bibó Kollégium (in the 1980s); head of
the Prime Minister's office under the first
Orbán cabinet (1998–2002); since 2010, the
Fidesz-appointed member of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court
Tellér, Gyula (b. 1934) Sociologist, poetry translator Longest-serving Orbán-advisor; head of the
“internal affairs” political analysis unit of the
prime ministerial office in 1998–2002; chief
policy advisor to Viktor Orbán from 2010
onward
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